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Abstract 
ln 1997 I worked with the OSCE in Bosnia organizing the first post-war municipal elections. 
During this time I was confronted with the massive efforts of the international community in 
Bosnia, the limited development of the peace process two years after the war and the need for a 
clearer sense of history in order to understand the best direction for international community in 
their ongoing intervention in Bosnia. Corning so close on the heels of this genocidal war, an 
established historical perspective on the war is still very much in the making. Using a spate of 
conversations l had with Bosnians regarding the war combined with recent readings on the war, I 
attempt a general overview of the war with an aim to orientating future international 
involvement. I begin with a brief overview of the ancient and recent history that lead up to the 
war. The paper then explores some of the problems inherent to the Dayton agreement. I explain 
my work on elections and explain how this relates to implementation of the Dayton peace 
agreement. In conclusion I develop some specific ideas about how international assistance could 
be more effective in promoting the peace process. 
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Bosnia: The Interface of Hope and History and Conundrum of Post-war 
International Intervention 
"The nights were filled with prudent and passionate whisperings in which pulsed invisible waves of 
the most daring dreams and wishes, the most improbable thoughts and plans which triumphed and 
broke in the blue darkness overhead. Next day at dawn, Turks and Serbs went out to work and 
met one another with the dull and expressionless faces, greeted one another and talked together 
with those hundred or so commonplace words of provincial courtesy which had fTom times past 
circulated in the town and passed from one to another like counterfeit coin which none the less 
makes communication possible and easy." (p. 83) 
"But the next day everything was as it had always been, for townsmen did not like to remember evil 
and did not worry about the future; in their blood was the conviction that real life consists of calm 
periods and that it would be mad and vain to spoil them by looking for some other, firmer more 
lasting life that did not exist." (p 99) 
"But misfortunes do not last forever (this they have in common with joys) but pass away or are at 
least diminished and become lost in oblivion." (p. 101) 
lvo Andric, The Rridge 011 the Drina, 1945 
I. Introduction 
ln the "The Tenth Circle of Hell: A Memoir of Life in the Death Camps of Bosnia", Rezak 
Hukanovic said, "in a war like this, truth had to be killed first". In the multi-ethnic tolerance and 
harmony that prevailed in post W.W.11 Yugoslavia, to begin a genocidal war, lies had to he told. 
One group of Slavic people had to be convinced that another group of their Slavic countrymen 
was inferior, impure and dangerous. Six hundred years of history had to be manipulated to 
appear to require an urgent and violent response. The response was an 'ethnic cleansing' that 
turned former friends into bitter enemies, forced farmers away from family to become roving 
militiamen, and changed the bucolic countryside of Bosnia into a war-zone dotted with 
concentration camps and mass graves. As a member of an international agency working in 
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Bosnia in 1997, I struggled to comprehend what had so recently transpired in this green, 
mountainous land of central Europe. This paper grows out of that effort to understand the 
origins and circumstances of this war in order to develop ideas about how the work of the 
international community could be more effective in this post-war period. 
In March of 1997 I went to Bosnia to work on the organization of the first post-war local 
elections. I was seconded by the U.S. State Department to the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation or the O.S.C.E. My job was to supervise the preparation and implementation of 
'free and fair' democratic local elections in three municipalities of Northwestern Bosnia. The 
organization of these elections by O.S.C.E. were a provision of the Dayton Agreement, the U.S. 
brokered peace agreement signed into acceptance on 14 December, 1995. The Dayton 
agreement stipulated that 'Free and democratic elections be held throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina next year.' and 'requested the O.S.C.E. to supervise the preparation and conduct of 
these elections.' I 
These were the first local elections since the war in Bosnia began in April, 1992. Elections were 
seen by the international community as a significant first step in realizing the long-term peace 
and reconciliation objectives of the Dayton Agreement. The hope for these elections was to 
establish a democratically elected, local leadership in post-war Bosnia. Despite the uneasy truce 
codified by the Dayton agreement, tensions between the three previously warring parties, the 
Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, were still very high. The Dayton 
Agreement stated that 'people displaced by the war will have the right to vote in their original 
place of residence if they so chose.' and that 'all of Bosnia's people will have the right to move 
freely throughout the country'. This provision falls beneath the umbrella of the pivotal promise 
1 OSCE Mission Member's Manuel, 7 Feb., 1996 
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of the peace agreement that 'refugees and displaced people will have the right to return home or 
receive just compensation.' 
The four year war in Bosnia was largely an effort of Serbs and sometimes Croats to force 
Muslims from lands in which they were living. It successfully 'cleansed' Mushms from large 
parts of the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement theoretical~y reversed the 
results of the war. It stated that everyone could return to their pre-war homes. The 1997 
municipal elections were seen as a significant first step in realizing this process. These elections 
allowed people to vote for their pre-war municipalities. This implied that elected leaders could 
return to areas from which they were forcibly removed by war and, just months later, hold 
significant political offices. Despite the promises and aspirations of the Dayton agreement, the 
affects of the war clearly could not be reversed by the signing of this peace accord. The fear, 
hatred and desire for revenge created by the war could not be forgotten with the signing of this 
agreement in Dayton, Ohio. 
Some saw these elections as a continuation of the nationalist* agendas over which the war was 
fought, but now settled by the far more civil and internationally monitored contest of voting. For 
the more pessimistically inclined, these elections would legitimize and solidify the influence of 
war-time leaders and the nationalist agendas that began the war. From an optimistic perspective, 
these elections would begin to reverse the 'ethnic cleansing' that forced the massive population 
displacement of almost two million people by having leaders from exiled communities elected 
into office in their pre-war municipalities. The elections would inevitably do a little of both. 
*For the purposes of this paper I will use the terms nationality and ethnicity interchangeably to 
designate generalized and locally understood differences between Serbs, Croats and Muslims. 
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1 was given two weeks notice before my departure date and by the end of March, 1997, I found 
myself as an Election Officer in Northwestern Bosnia helping to organize the registration and 
voting of an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people for the September 13 and 14 municipal 
elections. My area of responsibility included the municipalities of Sanski Most, Kljuc and 
Bosanski Petrovac, a mostly agricultural area nestled among green rolling mountains in 
Northwestern Bosnia. My responsibilities included: the registration and monitoring of political 
parties, the registration and polling of the local population as well as a significant displaced 
population temporarily living in the area, voter education, and the formation of local election 
commissions, the local bodies with whom the O.S.C.E. were to work in organizing and 
monitoring the election. 
1 began my work unprepared. Shortly after my arrival in Sanski Most I remember asking staff in 
my office about the ethnicity of the two major political parties, the SOS (Serb Democratic 
Party) and the SDA (Muslim Party for Democratic Action). A woman with whom I worked 
closely and who barely escaped with her life when the military branch of the SDS attacked her 
town said that if l did not know that l should not be there. I believe she was right. These were 
the political branches of the two major warring factions, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian 
Muslims. Amongst Mush ms, in the aftermath of a genocidal war against Muslims, an 
international Election Officer who did not understand these most basic aspects of the politics of 
the war continued a painful legacy of internationals who bungled in Bosnia. lt was essential that 
I quickly make sense of my work environment ifl was to work effectively. 
As anyone who has tried to follow Bosnian developments during or after the war would readily 
admit, the national and international situation defies simple explanations. Bosnia is located in 
the midst of diverse religious, ethnic, and geo-political interests; with a complex history of 
Russian and Greek Orthodox alliances to Serbs, German and Austrian Catholic alliances to 
Croats, and Turkish, Iranian and Islamic connections to the Bosnian Muslims. ft has a long, 
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frequently referred to, and often misused, history of conflict. During W.W.H Bosnia was the 
fighting ground for Serbian Chetniks, Croatian Ustache, Germany's invading armies and Tito's 
Yugoslav communists. World War I began in Bosnia with the murder of the Austrian Duke in 
Sarajevo. Between the 17th and 19th centuries areas of former Yugoslavia formed the shifting 
borders of the Ottoman empire and the Austro-Hungarian empire. Understanding the 
experience of the war for local people required some knowledge of the region's history and an 
awareness of the circumstances of the war. Coming to terms with how various f,TJ-oups in Bosnia 
viewed the international community was essential to understanding what was said, inferred and 
unsaid in meetings. Additionally, as a member of the international community organizing the 
structure through which political leaders were to be chosen in this complex and tense post-war 
period, it was important that I try to understand and describe to my local Bosnian colleagues the 
shifting, and sometimes shifty, role and limitations of the international community in this 
process. 
This essay is an effort to create a written map of the Bosnian situation as it related to my work. 
It is a product of the lessons learned from my work as well as from reading and especially from 
talking to Bosnians about the war. It starts with a bird's eye view that provides a brief outline of 
the ancient and recent history that led up to the war. The perspective then narrows, with a 
synopsis of an informal survey I conducted about the beginnings of the war in the area of 
Northwestern Bosnia where l was working. Of interest throughout is the role of the international 
community* in Bosnia, leading up to, during, and especially after the war. The war ended with 
the Dayton peace agreement which created an internationally monitored blueprint for the future 
of Bosnia as a nation. The paper explores some of the conundrums inherent to major provisions 
of the Dayton agreement and describes how this effected my work on the 1997 municipal 
* While l recognize the ambiguities of the concept, I use the tenn international community to 
mean the response of several nations acting in relative consensus for humanitarian purposes. 
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elections. In conclusion 1 speculate on the effort to recreate Bosnia as a unified, multi-ethnic 
state and develop some specific ideas about how international assistance to this 'unfinished 
peace' 2 process could be more effective. 
a) A Brief Historical Context 
This paper begins with a brief historical overview of the situation in Bosnia. The time line 
provided is a sketch of significant events that contribute to a long history of ethnic tensions. 
Many argue that the war in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia was inevitable, using this history of 
tension and conflict between Serbs, Muslims, Croats and other !:,'Toups in the area as evidence. 
My intention in providing a historical context is not to support this thesis. As can be inferred 
from several places in this paper, the area's history of conflict is more relevant as a tool for 
nationalist leaders to foster fear and instigate fighting then it is as evidence of an ever-present 
tension simmering beneath society at a popular level, and preparing to boil over. There was 
nothing inevitable about this war and if any single most significant cause were to be highlighted 
it should be the manipulation of this history and the media by a few radical nationalists, most 
noteworthy being Slobodan Milosovic, President of former Yugoslavia, Radavan Karadavic, 
war-time leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and Franco Tudjman, President of Croatia, to create a 
popular belief in the need for war. These three sought to consolidate political power by fanning 
the dim coals of nationalism into a fire. Through the war they expelled ethnic minorities from 
large areas of land and hoped to acquire great parts of Bosnia to serve the interests of a 'Greater 
Serbia' or a larger Croatia. 
2 Unfinished Peace, International Commission on the Balkans 
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The following time line is a list of major events over the past six hundred years that are 
significant to Bosnia as a state or to ethnic tensions in the area. They assume some familiarity 
with the region. For a more detailed and expanded history of the region see Malcom, Noel. 
Hosnia: A Short History, 1994 or West, Rebecca Hlack Lamb and Grey Falcon, 1982. (also 
references in the bibliography.) 
b) Time-line of Significant Events leading up to the Recent Hostilities in Bosnia 
1389 - The Kingdom of Serbia suffers a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 
Kosovo and becomes part of the expanding Ottoman empire. 
1463 - Bosnia loses its independence and becomes a part of the Ottoman empire 
1463 - 1878 Many Bosnians become Muslim under the influence oflslamic conquerors. 
However four major religions co-exist in a tolerance that is unusual for the period. As the 
Ottoman Empire's borders recede Muslim Slavs from other provinces seek refuge in Bosnia. 
1878 - As the Ottoman Empire is disintegrating, Bosnia - Herzegovina is given to 
Austria-Hungary. After 500 years of Ottoman Muslim rule, Serbia is given independence. 
1878 - 1918 Eastern Orthodox Russia promotes Orthodox Serbia in the nationalist dream of a 
great South Slav state under the leadership of Serbia. Muslim Slavs continue to promote a 
pluralist, multi-ethnic state. 
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1914 - A Serb nationalist assassinates the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, marking the 
beginning of W.W.I 
1918 - Serbia's ruler was crowned king of the south Slav state of Yugoslavia. 
1918 -1941 Nationalist tensions thrive and the country becomes factionalized. Unresolved social 
and economic issues help propel the Yugoslav Communist Party. 
1941 - Hitler invades Yugoslavia. The land is parceled out to Germany's allies. A fascist regime 
in Croatia, the Croatian Ustasha, ethnically cleanse areas of Serbs, Gypsies, Jews and political 
opponents. Similar ethnic cleansing happens in Serbia, the first Nazi satellite state to declare 
itself "Judenrein", cleansed of Jews. Chetniks in Serbia begin a campaign of extending Serbia's 
borders to include Bosnia- Herzegovina and Croatia. Bosnia becomes a killing ground as 
Croatian Ustasha, Serbian Chetniks, German and Italian occupation troops, and the Communist 
Partisans fight each other and seek control of the local population. 
1945- 1980 Tito's Yugoslav communists receive help from the Soviet Union and manage to 
emerge as the undisputed masters of Yugoslavia. Tito breaks with Stalin and becomes a leader 
of the international non-aligned movement. Yugoslavia becomes a beneficiary of the Cold War 
assistance. Tito manages to curb nationalist and religious tensions. The country includes six 
republics, Bosnia - Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia. 
1980-1990 Tito dies. The unity of Yugoslavia falters. The Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe 
collapses. East and West Germany unite. 
c) 1986- 1992 The Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
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1986 - Slobodan Milosevic becomes president of Serbia and embraces an extreme version of 
nationalism. 
1989, March - Kosovo, which is 90 % Muslim Albanian, has its autonomy taken away. Local 
resistance is brutally crushed. This is seen by many as the first step in Milosevic's attempt to 
realize the idea of 'Greater Serbia'. Other states become quite concerned. 
1991 - Slovenia, the most prosperous and westernized repubhc, grows frustrated with 
Milosevic's attempts to seize greater control, and declares independence. The Yugoslav federal 
army, which was 70 % Serb, is called upon to prevent the succession but fails miserably. 
1991 - Croatia, home to a large Serb population, declares independence. The Yugoslav army 
begins a full scale offensive and intense fighting ensues, ending in a UN brokered cease-fire with 
a third of Croatia under Serbian forces. This fighting is characterized by 'ethnic cleansing', and 
the targeting of civilians and cultural landmarks. 
1992 - Germany's recognition of Croatian and Slovene independence further isolates 
Yugoslavia's efforts to maintain control and greatly exacerbates the situation. Macedonia's 
secession is imminent. 
1992, April 5 - With US encouragement Bosnia declares independence. The Yugoslav National 
Army immediately begins attacking citizens in Sarajevo. An anns embargo is placed on 
former-Yugoslavia, making it very difficult for the vastly weaker Bosnians to defend themselves 
against Serb forces. Methods of ethnic cleansing include killing of non-Serb civic, religious and 
intellectual leaders, the confinement of aJI males of military age into concentration camps, and 
the use of rape as a weapon of terror. 
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1993 - Croat nationahsts begin their own "ethnic cleansing" campaign of Bosnian Muslims in an 
effort to carve an all Croat homeland in Herzegovina. 
1994 - Eventually Bosnian Croats and Muslims join in an marriage of convenience to fight Serb 
forces. This shaky alliance is maintained in the Dayton agreement. 
This time-line is a very brief synopsis of the history, recent and ancient, that lead to the 
genocidal war the world recently watched on TV. It demonstrates how far back some of these 
tensions go and helps to underscore the kind of issues that nationalists used to gamer support for 
their cause. The first step to understanding this war is to clarify who was fighting who in 
Bosnia. During the first two years of the war in Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were 
seeking to cleanse parts of Bosnia of Bosnian Muslims. In 1994, Bosnian Croats shifted sides 
and joined forces with Bosnian Muslims to fight Bosnian Serbs in a US brokered agreement. 
Throughout the war Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces were mostly controlled and greatly 
assisted by Serb and Croat governments in their respective states. 
U. The War at a Popular Level, Neighbor against Neighbor 
Far more mystifying and troubling than the war between Serb, Croat or Muslim forces is how 
civilians came to believe the lies of nationalist war-mongers and were convinced of the need to 
take anns against neighbors. Though there were roving groups of para-military Serb nationalists 
who came from Serbia into Bosnia to fight this war, there were many Bosnian Serbs who were 
suddenly whipped into a frenzy of genocidal killing, cruel torture and organized rape after years 
of living harmoniously with Muslims. l have found nothing that adequately explains this. While 
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in Bosnia I carried out my own informal survey by asking people questions about the beginnings 
of the war. I wanted to understand how civilians became convinced of the need to take up arms 
against neighboring civilians, especially in this case of an unusually tolerant multi-ethnic state in 
which one third of all urban marriages were across ethnicities. I asked people l met how the war 
began for them and what they understood of its beginnings. Most of the people I spoke to were 
from Prijedor. Prijedor is one of the largest cities in Bosnia with a population of over one 
hundred thousand. It was roughly forty percent Bosnian Muslim and forty percent Bosnian Serb 
before the war. The following is an extraction of many different accounts of the beginning of 
fighting in Prijedor. 
a) A Synthesis of the Local Muslim Perspective on the Beginning of the War in Prijedor 
I. Pre-War Relations 
When l began asking people about the beginnings of the war I was concerned that my questions 
might appear voyeuristic or force people to reopen difficult experiences that they were trying to 
put behind them. I learned that if the war were brought up at an appropriate time and in a 
sensitive manner, people were very willing to talk at length about its origins. Most Bosnians are 
struggling to understand the war and despite strong emotions, the opportunity to voice thoughts 
on how and why it began and took the shape that it took could be a part of this process. I 
frequently brought people back to visit their pre-war homes. I drove an international vehicle that 
could safely and easily cross the inter-ethnic border line. My office promised local leaders that 
we would provide transportation, communication and facilitation assistance to any meeting in 
which Muslims and Serbs from either side of the inter-ethnic border line sought to meet and 
discuss constructive issues. In carrying displaced minorities back to their pre-war towns and 
villages, Bosnians would inevitably bring up issues connected to what was happening early in the 
war when they were first forced to leave their homes. 
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Most of the younger urban people T spoke to claimed that there was almost no thought given to 
the nationality of others as they grew up. This varied slightly but most described nationality, 
ethnicity or religion as insignificant. Some said that they had heard occasional derogatory 
remarks about another ethnicity from older family members. They described hearing things like 
'Muslims have too many children' or 'Serbs are dirty', but for most of the young these beliefs 
were considered the idiosyncrasies of an older generation. Most Muslim men I spoke to had 
dated Serbian girls, and had Serbian best friends and neighbors. Physically Serbs, Croats and 
Muslims look identical, and so names are the only way people know the historical ethnicity or 
religion of another. Since religion had been largely repressed during Tito's time and national 
distinctions were encouraged only in the form of innocuous songs or handicrafts, for the young, 
and especially urban dwellers, nationalism seemed mostly absent in daily interactions. 
Few older people would be as dismissive of these issues as the young. Almost anyone who had 
lived in a city must have worked closely with and had friends and neighbors who were of other 
nationalities. Unlike the young who could say they were largely unaware of the differences, 
older people said that in many cases national differences became inconsequential over time with 
their friends and neighbors but not forgotten. Older people were much more conscious of issues 
of religion and nationality, but most said it rarely was discussed before the war. 
Rural areas could be quite different. There were certain villages that had a reputation of being 
openly hostile to particular nationalities before the war. Jn the area 1 worked I heard more of 
Serb villages that were intolerant of Muslims. Muslims could be beat up or molested if they 
were in these areas after dark. Muslims rarely went to these areas which were generally well off 
the beaten track. In these areas that were less effected by modernity and the Yugoslav state, 
history remained more current and intolerance more common. 
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2. Manipulation by Local Media and The Beginnings of Ethnic Cleansing 
When Bosnia declared independence in April of 1992 there was much uncertainty about how 
Serbia would react. Nobody believed that things could possibly regress to the warring chaos that 
had been seen during W.W.Il. In the forty-five years since W.W.II, Yugoslavia had been 
peaceful and prosperous. But shortly after Bosnia's declaration of independence, some sort of 
nationalist forces took over all the radio stations and media in Prijedor. This group began a 
belligerent media campaign claiming that the Muslims were planning an attack on the city. 
Radio stations soon announced that Muslim forces were in fact surrounding the city and 
preparing for an attack at any moment. Civilians were warned to prepare for this attack by 
arming themselves and to vigilantly prevent Muslims from gathering. Muslim leaders, 
intellectuals and celebrities began to disappear or were found dead. Local Muslims families 
were forced to turn in any weapons they had. 
1t was not long before all civil institutions broke down. The police stations quickly became 
centers of Serb nationalist activities. Most Muslims remained hidden in their houses and had no 
place to turn to when problems arose. The media reported that the people responsible for the 
Muslim conspiracy were being arrested and detained. Everyone was asked to prepare for the 
worst. Local Serbs were advised to be proactive in their preparations for a Muslim attack. 
Before long most Muslim men of military age were in camps or killed. Those that remained 
behind were advised to evacuate or fear reprisals. Families were charged large sums of money 
for the opportunity to board a bus carrying nothing and travel to the border of Croatia or to 
Muslim parts of Bosnia. Those who remained behind were terrorized until leaving seemed the 
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only hope of survival. Within a short period of time every Muslim from the area had been forced 
to leave, imprisoned, or killed. 3 
It remains to be explained why so many Serbs believed this kind of propaganda about former 
neighbors and friends especially in the absence of any physical evidence of organized revolt. It 
would be revealing to know how many Serbs did not believe what was being told to them but felt 
unable to resist the contagion of nationalist fervor or submitted reluctantly. lt will probably 
remain forever unexplainable why many Bosnian Serbs were driven to beat, torture, starve, and 
rape Muslims during this four year war. 
b) Mass Killings and Graves 
The expulsion of Muslims from Prijedor described above may help to explain how the war began 
in some places, but as the ethnic cleansing progressed an ill-equipped Muslim resistance formed 
and front lines were drawn. As full-scale war developed, the ethnic cleansing of areas became 
significantly more violent and brutal. One tactic that remains easily documentable after the war 
is mass graves. After the take-over of a village, all the remaining survivors of a battle were lined 
up before a large hole, and hopefully shot, before being buried. 
In other cases Muslims were taken to prison camps, starved, tortured, and raped as policy of war 
directed by Radavan Karadavic, the Bosnian Serb leader, who is a Columbia University trained 
poet/psychologist turned nationalist war monger. These policies were part of a conscious effort 
to demoralize the enemy in a fight that was waged on psychological as well as physical fronts. 
In the area where l worked the discovery and unearthing of mass grave sites was very common 
and the local emotions that accompanied disinterment were enormous. A mass grave that was 
3 Hukanovic, The Tenth Circle of Hell 
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being unearthed just up the road from my office was discovered to have a live mine only after 
two people lost a leg while trying to identify partly decomposed bodies, an incredibly cruel 
gesture on the part of some departing soldier. 
These sites are a kind of living testimony to the horror of the war. Most Muslim families are still 
missing family members. Sometimes it is only the discovery of the body that will finally put to 
rest the remote hope that a family member could be living. For many, only a proper burial of the 
dead will allow the living to rest in peace. Keeping records of the missing, identifying bodies, 
making records for the war crime tribunal and contacting relatives, required far more 
coordination and resources then were locally available. In the area where 1 was living, when a 
mass grave was being unearthed there was often no witnesses outside of the local population and 
limited records were kept. One day, when enough time has passed that people have some 
perspective on this war and historians are trying to create an honest account, the lack of clearly, 
and impartially verified and documented disinterments will mean that this important history 
remains contested. 
c) The Media Penetrates Prison Camps 
The arrival of international news reporters in some of the prison camps in 1993, Omarska 
outside of Prijedor being the first and one of the most famous, woke up the world to what was 
happening. Little happened, though, to prevent the genocide for another two years despite 
international awareness through daily observation. However the media's discovery of these 
camps did make a localized but significant difference. The most immediate result was that Serb 
forces closed some of these camps and freed surviving prisoners. Serbs were pressured to hide 
or clean up the concentration camps and to lessen more extreme forms of torture. For those 
living in camps this kind of change is enormous and demonstrates the results media attention 
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combined with public pressure can have. The longer tenn result of disclosing these prison 
camps with captives obviously beaten and on the edge of starvation, was that it nudged the 
painfully slow process of international intervention slightly forward. National governments 
could no longer claim that this was a civil war as a means to justify inaction. These pictures and 
accompanying reports made it all too clear that the elimination of a particular ethnic group from 
a large area ofland was the motivation of this war. The resemblance to Hitler's Nazi Germany 
became undeniable. With international public opinion more convinced than ever that some kind 
international intervention was necessary Clinton ran for office on a platform of greater US 
engagement in Bosnia and by the middle of 1995 US military intervention finally brought the 
warring parties to the negotiating table. 
HI. The End of the War and the Dayton Peace Plan 
a) The Involvement of the International Community 
The war began in the area of Bosnia Herzegovina in April of 1992 and continued through to 
November of 1995. Much of the world watched this genocide from the comfort of their homes. 
There is an enonnous and necessary history to be told regarding the international efforts, bungles 
and avoidance of intervening more directly, forcibly, or clearly in this war. The mistakes made 
in Bosnia should be understood and remembered so as to prevent them from happening again. In 
this paper though I will only outline a few noteworthy international efforts in Bosnia. It is not 
my intention in this paper to develop a critique of failed diplomacy during this war. However, as 
a member of the international community working in Bosnia it was necessary to understand that 
these events stood out in the mind of Bosnians. This legacy of international bungles and inaction 
during the war hangs like an albatross over the shoulder of every international working in Bosnia 
after the war. 
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I. International Efforts in Bosnia Commonly Viewed as Failures 
• German and then European recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia forced 
fonner Yugoslavia to contend with its disintegration rather than encouraging a diplomatic 
arrangement. 4 
• The US lead an international trade embargo of former Yugoslavia during the war which 
helped to keep the warring parties hugely mismatched. When the war began Serbs 
controlled 70 % of the Yugoslav army. 
• The UN declared safe havens near active fronts, encouraging civilians to seek shelter from 
the war in these areas. These safe havens became death camps when Serbs attacked and 
UN soldiers were not given authorization to fight or were taken hostage. The worst of these 
is the fall of Srebenica between July 12 and July 16, 1995 when seven thousand seventy-nine 
civilians were killed in mass executions and ambushes after promises of UN protection. This 
is Europe's worst massacre since World War II. 5 
• UN soldiers unable to protect themselves were taken hostage by Serb forces and held the 
international community at their mercy. 
• Many failed peace plans ended up being cease-fires for military rest and regrouping. 
• Tremendous amounts of war assistance ended up in the hands of combatants. 
4G. C. Thomas, Ragu, "Self-Determination and International Recognition Policy" World Affairs, 
Summer 1997 
5Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. p. 68-72 
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2. International Accomplishments During the War 
Despite the many ways the international efforts could be credited with making the situation 
worse than it already was this war was clearly a war fought by peoples of former Yugoslavia, 
and instigated primarily by internal politics. The international community could also be credited 
with some substantial accomplishments in this terribly destructive affair. 
• Billions of dollars provided assistance to the war affected. Great efforts were made to 
reconnect war separated families. 
• Several hundred thousand refugees were at least temporarily resettled in host countries. 
• Fear of international reprisal occasionally contained the Serbs from being more aggressive or 
ruthless. 
• The arrival of international reporters to concentration camps changed international public 
opinion and pressured national governments to respond more aggressively to this war. 
• The end of the war was finally hastened by the US bombing of several essential sites of the 
Bosnian Serb military. 
• Muslim I Croat military advances with international assistance forced the Serbs to begin 
bargaining. In November of 1995 the internationally brokered Dayton agreement effectively 
ended the war. 
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b) The Dayton Agreement: Clashing Perspectives and Agendas 
1. Background 
Rarely does idealism and reality clash so starkly and yet move on together as in this uneasy but 
enforced truce. To over-simplify a more complex situation, there are four major perspectives 
that clash in the future of Bosnia, providing a context for the implementation of the Dayton 
agreement. Bosnian Seib leaders want the territories that they have taken in Bosnia and would 
prefer to be left alone. They might try to join the state of greater-Serbia. Bosnian Muslim want 
their homes or just compensation, justice, and for some, revenge, for what they have suffered at 
the hands of the Serbs. They would prefer not to be left as a small and isolated Muslim state in 
the middle of central Europe beside unfriendly neighbors. Bosnian Croat leaders would prefer to 
take their small part of Bosnia and join prosperous Croatia. The international community would 
like to see a multi-ethnic, democratic state in which refugees returned from host countries to 
their prewar homes and Bosnia functioned as a single country. 
I include a fifth perspective, one rarely referred to because it is not a unified group and has no 
paiiicular ideology attached to it. It is your average citizen from all paiis of Bosnia who would 
like to see the cessation of ethnic hostilities, war reconstruction, a secure and stable future, 
economic prosperity, and reconciliation. This group by birth belongs to one of the three big 
nationalities but is more concerned with their immediate family and their local community than 
the 'nation' as a whole. This average citizen is largely pre-occupied with the affairs of daily life 
and post-war survival but is also easily manipulated by media and politicians. This group is 
fearful that their lives will be interrupted again by forces from other national groups who 
continue to be presented to them as belligerent neighbors preparing for battle. The media and 
politicians throughout Bosnia continue to promote this fear by building upon the interests of a 
particular national group while denigrating other groups. 
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This took several different forms. In the area I was working the local Mushm radio station and 
newspaper often recounted war atrocities in great detail with claims like, "We will never 
forget." or "We will have revenge."6 Other stories often told of events that supposedly happened 
to Muslims who were in nearby Serb areas. Often these were fabricated and almost always 
exaggerated or one-sided. I knew of very similar claims made in Serb newspapers. 
Many individuals find themselves in an uneasy tension between the agenda and identity of their 
national group and their own hopes for the future. One result of this war is that most citizens 
feel a greatly intensified identification with their own ethnicity and religion. Another result of 
the war is that the desire for a more peaceful and secure future holds more power and meaning 
than it held before the war. The Dayton agreement, and its contradictions, resonates with the 
tensions within many individuals. 
2. The Agreement 
The Dayton Agreement is an agreement the Serbs, Croats and Muslims could sign and the 
international community could endorse. This peculiar mix of interests creates a blueprint for 
Bosnia's future riddled with inherent contradictions. 7 The peace plan inextricably involves the 
international community in the national and domestic issues of this re-formed country. It both 
accepts many of the results of the war at the same time that it is a formula for reversing the 
separation of people, land and ethnicity created by the war. It establishes Bosnia Herzegovina as 
a single, multi-ethnic state divided into two ethnically divided entities. One of the two territories 
is called the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with 51 % of the land and inhabited almost 
6 Articles in the Pri/edor Mirror, Summer 1997 
7 Unfinished Peace, p. xix 
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entirely by Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the other is the Republic of Serpska with 49 % of the 
land and inhabited by Bosnian Serbs. The agreement seems to legalize the ethnic division 
created by the war. It creates two parallel, formerly warring, governments within a single 
government. lt forces Croats and Muslims together in the Federation despite their recent history 
of war and distrust. The agreement called for tremendous international involvement in the 
political processes of the new country. The following is a summary of the agreement. 
3. Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement8 
• The agreement settles the territorial issues over which the war was fought. 
• Bosnia and Herzegovina continues as a single state, but divides into two administrative 
entities. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will administer 51% of the country, the 
Republic of Serpska will administer 49% of the country. 
• There will be freedom to travel anywhere throughout the country. 
• Refugees and displaced people will have the right to return home or obtain just 
compensation for lost land and housing. 
• Free and democratic elections will be held, organized by an international organization. 
People displaced by the war wi 11 have the right to vote in their pre-war place of residence. 
8 OSCE Mission Member's Manual. 7. Summary of the Peace Agreement 
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• The militaries must withdraw forces behind an agreed upon cease fire line. The withdrawal 
and activities of local military forces will be monitored by NA TO forces called SFOR under 
a US general. SFOR will implement and monitor the peace agreement and defend it 
vigorously under all circumstances. 
• The Office of the High Representative will be created to implement and coordinate civilians 
aspects of the peace agreement. 
• International donors will implement a program to help reconstruct Bosnia. 
• Sanctions will be I ifted but reinstated if necessary to encourage compliance. 
• Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina commit to fully cooperate with the international 
investigation and prosecution of war crimes. Indicted criminals will not be allowed to hold 
office. 
• A UN International Police Task Force will train and advise enforcement personnel, and 
monitor law enforcement activities, facilities, and proceedings. 
The Dayton agreement distributed land between the two entities and three ethnicities within this 
single country. It created the constitutional and civil structure for governing this divided 
country. lt also created mechanisms for implementing an uneasy truce. The agreement called 
for an international military, police force, court system, election agency, human rights 
organization and coordinating body to oversee and assist the newly formed country in a variety 
oflargely domestic issues. The agreement additionally promised development and 
war-reconstruction assistance. Almost all international agencies in Bosnia play some part in the 
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larger process of realizing the Dayton agreement. My work with O.S.C.E. in Bosnia was part of 
the organization's mission to oversee elections. 
IV. The Electior.5 
a) General Background 
Internationals in Bosnia liked to say this was the most complicated election ever. Half the 
population of the country was displaced, a few hundred thousand lived as refugees in countries 
throughout the world. Many people had lost all forms of valid identification as a result of the 
war. A highly significant and difficult provision of the Da11on Agreement allowed citizens the 
choice of voting where they lived before the war or where they have lived since the war ended. 
As a result of this provision a major issue of the election was which national parties would be 
elected into office in areas from which all their nationals had been forced to vacate during the 
war. This was seen as a major first step in the process of reversing the ethnic separation that was 
a result of the war. But this same issue, who would live where, was the issue over which the war 
was fought 
J. O.S.C.E. - Organization for Security and Cooperation 
I was seconded to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or O.S.C.E .. 
O.S.C.E. came out of talks in the 1970s between the United States and the Soviet Union and 
other nuclear powers over nuclear weaponry. It was designed to establish programs of 
confidence-building and mutual vulnerability between nations with nuclear weaponry as a way 
of preventing a surprise attack. The O.S.C.E. has been labeled a post-modem organization. The 
more traditional concept of the nation-state is weakened as the organization seeks to 
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institutionalize a highly developed system for mutual interference in member nations domestic 
affairs when security issues are at stake. The forty-three member states agree to manage their 
arn1ed forces and defense policies according to O.S.C.E. principles. It is an institutionalized 
forum for meddling in what has been traditionally considered the domestic affairs of nations . 9 
2. Local Area Background: the Municipalities of Sanski Most, Kljuc and Bosanski Petrovac 
I was sent to Sanski Most, the largest of the three municipalities in which I was to work. 
National elections had been organized by the O.S.C.E. a year earlier so there was already an 
infrastructure and office set up by the organization when l arrived. l was to work with Local 
Election Commissions in each municipality in organizing this election. Sanski Most had almost 
equal Muslim and Serb populations before the war. During the war it was taken by the Serbs 
and cleansed of all Muslims. Near the end of the war, shortly before the signing of the Dayton 
agreement, it was taken back by Muslim and Croat forces, and almost all the Serb civilians left 
as the Serb military retreated. Since the peace agreement in 1995 it had been resettled by around 
sixty thousand people, about half were Bosnian Muslims from the area, slightly less than half 
were displaced Muslims from nearby areas in the Republic of Serpska. There is also a small 
population of Bosnian Croats. The three municipalities l worked in were adjacent to Republic of 
Serpska and the boundary line which separates the two entities, known as the Inter-ethnic Border 
Line, or the IEBL. Due to this area's proximity to areas of the Serb Republic from which many 
Muslims are in forced exile, this area was home to the largest number of displaced communities 
in Bosnia. 
My work also involved the two smaller municipalities ofKljuc and Bosanski Petrovac, with 
estimated populations of eighteen thousand and eight thousand respectively. Kljuc was located 
9Cooper, Robert. The Post-A1odern State and the World Order. p. 22-26 
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adjacent to the IEBL on the main road that connected Western Bosnia to the rest of the country. 
Before the war Bosanski Petrovac was a mostly Serb town, but at the time of this election, it was 
almost entirely inhabited by displaced Muslims. This population shift made the election in 
Bosanski Petrovac of particular interest. The displaced Muslims that lived in the municipality 
were likely to vote for their pre-war municipalities. It was very possible that even a small Serb 
vote could elect Serbs into all the major municipal offices of this Muslim town. 
b) Organizing the Election 
In an election in which fifty percent of the electorate nationwide was displaced by war, O.S.C. E. 
was going to have to decide who could legitimately vote where. It was obvious to anyone 
interested which areas of the country were going to be politically contested based on pre-war 
populations. The general thrust of the election was that the major Serb parties were going to 
consolidate power in the areas that they had taken during the war, whereas the main Muslim 
party was trying to reclaim influence over areas from which they had been forced. The national 
elections a year earlier showed some political parties would make a great effort to manipulate 
election results. O.S.C.E. was forced to devise a criteria by which registering voters could 
establish citizenship and residency before the war in 1991 or residency in 1995 when the war 
ended. Most municipalities were missing record books and many people had little to verify 
location of residency six years earlier. O.S.C.E. had to determine which government agencies 
would be allowed to issue certificates of citizenship and what combination of documents would 
be acceptable. 
A six week registration period was organized three months before this election. Anyone 
interested in voting would have to register at this time and be able to verify their right to vote in 
their pre-war or post-war residence. The legitimacy of voters would be determined in this period 
and questionable registrations could, in theory, be researched. Having this aspect of the election 
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determined far ahead of the election made it easier to detect questionable trends in voter 
registration. 
The O.S.C.E. advertised itself as organizing 'free and fair democratic elections'. However the 
unusual circumstances of the election forced the organization to compromise both the freedom 
and the fairness of the election registration. 'Fair' included preventing people from 
manipulating the vote by voting in places that they falsely claimed to have settled in since the 
end of the war or did not live in before the war. 'Free' included allowing all eligible citizens to 
vote even if documentation was difficult and legitimacy was uncertain. As cases of voter 
registration abuse were detected, an ever-expanding set of criteria and steps to adjudicate 
questionable residency claims were created. These restrictions disenfranchised some citizens 
because they did not have the required documentation, while some illegitimate voters were 
probably allowed to register because criteria could not become too restrictive. Considering the 
country had been at war just one and a half years earlier about issues that were being worked out 
in this election, these compromises were unfortunate but necessary. 
C) Protecting Bosnians from O.S.C.E. 
Although admittedly the O.S.C.E. was facing enormous obstacles in organizing an election at 
this fragile moment in Bosnia's peace process, I found the organization sorely lacking in 
organizational foresight and political integrity. O.S.C.E. was often unresponsive to the field, 
weak in the face of political pressure, and arbitrary about implementing election directives. I 
frequently knew of situations when the organization was warned of problems an initiative was 
going to create and yet nothing would be done until the problem had grown unmanageable. This 
became most acute during the registration process when myself and several others warned the 
organization that the wording on the registration form which was to be filled out by every voter 
in the country was unclear and probably wrong. The question asked the registrant if they 
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intended to vote 'in' their 1991 municipality or 'in' their 1997 municipality. The word should 
have been' for', because many voters would vote 'in' their 1997 municipality 'for' their 1991 
municipality by absentee ballot. The O.S.C.E. waited until after the registration process and 
after receiving thousands of wrongly registered voters before trying to correct this mistake 
despite warnings early in the process. I suspect the problem was never adequately fixed. 
Oversights of this sort were fairly typical and tremendous amounts of energy were expended 
fixing problems that should have been avoided. 
From the field it usually appeared that the O.S.C.E. Headquarters in Sarajevo were unaware of 
the activities of its various branches. Field Offices would receive orders from one part of the 
organization that conflicted with directives from other parts of the organization. This became 
particularly problematic when we received allocation of money for registration and polling 
station staff, only to have it over-ridden a few days later. 
One of the most frustrating moments of my work came just a day or two after the election. The 
organization removed a requirement for 'proportional representation' in municipal assemblies 
from the lTlection Rules and Regulations*, a decision that would obviously weaken Muslim 
parties. Without 'proportional representation' it would be easier for newly formed municipal 
assemblies to systematically block unwanted minority groups from holding as many seats as they 
had received in proportion to the vote. Striking 'proportional representation' meant a party 
could receive 40 % of the vote but potentially receive a far smaller percentage of the municipal 
seats if a coalition against the party were formed. This was apparently done under pressure from 
Croat and Serb parties that were concerned about the strength of Muslim parties in many 
'ethnically cleansed' municipalities. This was akin to changing the ante in a poker game after 
the hand had been played. In another example the organization had not managed to compile the 
*Rules created by OSCE to govern these elections. 
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candidate lists until just before the election. Many candidates who had been doing campaign 
preparations were inexplicably left off the list. I succeeded in my area after a great conflict with 
the OSCE Headquarters office to have missing candidates added by hand at the last minute to the 
candidate list but l suspect in many places candidates suddenly found themselves unable to run. 
I sometimes felt like part of my job was to protect people in my area ofresponsibihty from my 
organization. 
V. The Impracticality of Return 
a) Partition or Return? 
The central issue to international efforts in Bosnia's future, after preventing the resumption of 
war, is whether to accept partition of the country or to struggle to reverse it. The division of the 
country into two entities is a kind of partition that may become more or less entrenched over 
time. The return of displaced ethnic minorities to both sides of IEBL would reverse this 
separation but as of Spring of 1998 very few people had returned. 
On the surface of things the idea of people returning back across the ethnic divide to lands from 
which they have so recently been brutally 'ethnically cleansed' appears 'highly problematic'. 
This was a war in which two to three hundred thousand, mostly Muslim civilians, were killed. A 
nationalist war in which rape was a policy demanded by commanding officers to demoralize the 
enemy. A time of wide spread torture and starvation in prison camps. A place where the beating 
of prisoners as drunken sport was common and neighbors took arms against neighbors. To many 
Bosnians, international aid workers come to Bosnia from the complacent suburbs of developed 
West European or North American cities seeking good salaries. The local perception is that the 
staff of international agencies are often indifferent and usually unaware of the circumstances of 
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the war. In the aftermath of this war, when international agencies create programs suggesting 
displaced people return to their pre-war homes and reconcile their national differences or have a 
just exchange of property, and justify these programs as provisions of the Dayton agreement, 
Bosnians perceive the naivete and the lack of local awareness for which international aid and 
development workers have become infamous. Four years of war have been fought over the issue 
of who would live where and yet the Dayton agreement envisions a return to life as it was before 
the war. This seems to deny the terrible lasting reality of the war for so many people. This 
suggests the sudden end of tremendous distrust, fear, hatred, and an intense desire for revenge. 
This would involve a willingness to trust large political and administrative institutions, 
institutions which in the view of most have recently failed terribly. 
So, while acknowledging enormous obstacles, why does return to a harmonious multi-ethnic 
state appear possible? This question is central to all the long-term international projects in 
Bosnia. I will address this question from a several directions. I will begin in a broadly 
philosophic vein and then develop ideas for a more systematic approach to the process of 
implementing the Dayton agreement. 
The war in Bosnia is testimony to the malleability of the human spirit. The great mystery of the 
war is how Yugoslav citizens quickly changed from relatively peaceful neighbors to brutal 
warring forces. The great tragedy of the war is the plight of unsuspecting Central European 
Muslims turned overnight into desperate victims struggling with existence against genocidal 
forces. The outbreak of a war from the recent peace of pastoral Yugoslavia exemplifies the 
extremes to which people can adapt It demonstrates how a group of people can be manipulated 
into believing a lie about the supposed threat of an ethnicity or religion. It exemplifies the 
abuses of history for political purposes. Radical adaptation and social transformation need not 
happen only in the direction of violence and destruction. Great shifts in national politics and 
human consciousness flow in both directions, not just those built upon lies or manipulation. The 
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idea of the European Union after W.W. 1 and W.W. 11, and the end of the Cold War demonstrate 
that hostile relations can subside. With the passing of time effort must be made to resuscitate the 
ethnic relations that existed just prior to this war. In general terms the long term goals of the 
international community in Bosnia include the less tangible effort to undo the lies that began the 
war while creating programs that encourage ethnic reconciliation combined with the more 
tangible goals of mediating and containing political tensions and reconstructing the economic 
and material infrastructure of the country. 
Though the history of ethnic conflict in Balkan history is undeniable, post W.W.If Yugoslavia 
and Bosnia was an example of unusual ethnic tolerance. One third of all urban marriages was 
across ethnicities. Most of the young people I spoke to developed friendships with their 
countrymen regardless of ethnicity or religion. Though older and more traditional people may 
have exchanged the 'counterfeit coin' of 'provincial courtesy' across ethnicities while harboring 
distrust, by most indications this distrust was fading. Based on my conversations with Bosnians, 
before the war ethnicity had become mostly insignificant in daily life. And then a few 
nationalist leaders fanned the slumbering embers of nationalism back into a flaming fire. Tfthe 
ugly flame had not been stoked in all likelihood it would have smoldered quietly until forgotten. 
At more tangible levels, during my time in Bosnia I saw many instances of hope for the future of 
ethnic relations. l helped set up meetings between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb 
politicians, and watched people in these meetings return to levels of acceptance that they 
themselves had not imagined possible just before the meeting. I carried Muslims and Serbs 
back and forth across the I.E.B.L. to areas that they lived before the war and watched them greet 
as wary friends, wishing this war had not created the gulf between them. Large groups of people 
were organized in communities around the country with the intention to return. During the war 
and increasing today, people are anxious to resume business ties across the two entities. 
Everyday on the I.E.B.L. there are groups of people from both sides of the country meeting for 
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picnics and drinking plum brandy together. The war forced people to lose a basic belief in the 
humanity of the 'other'. The question the international community has to ask itself as an agent 
intervening forcibly in Bosnian affairs is what can it do to foster ethnic and religious tolerance 
and reconciliation. There are four general forms international intervention in post-war Bosnia 
can take. 
h) Four Generalized Forms of International Intervention or Assistance 
l. Removal 
The most aggressive form is removing or sidelining the forces that promote ethnic animosity or 
fear. This began when American forces bombed Bosnian Serb forces. The arrest of politically 
active war criminals, most noteworthy being Radavan Karadvic, is another example. Curbing 
media that thrives on ethnic divisiveness is another example. 
2) Arbitration and Mediation 
A second direction of international intervention is arbitrating and mediating issues that are 
likely to be divisive along ethnic lines. A good example of this is the War Crimes Tribunal. If 
war criminals are going to be tried, an international body like the War Crimes Tribunal is 
required to conduct these investigations. It is unreasonable to expect Bosnians to try war 
criminals themselves because of the tensions this would create. An example of where 
international arbitration is required is settlement of land claim disputes. Neither Bosnian Croats, 
Serbs or Muslims are likely to trust one another in the settlement of monetary compensation for 
land lost during the war and an outside party is required. The international monitoring of the 
elections helped both sides to accept an election that would not have been accepted if locally 
organized. The return of displaced people will continue to require international arbitration. 
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3. Reconstruction and Development 
A third direction is war reconstruction and development. The sooner the economy and social 
services of Bosnia are functioning with relative stability, the more daily life is likely to return to 
normal. If Bosnians of each ethnicity feel economically secure then they are less likely to blame 
others for their misfortunes and likely to become less fearful of the future. The sooner school 
children are back in school and social services are returned, the more Bosnians will feel their 
lives are returning to normal. 
4. Direct Work on Ethnic Reconciliation 
A forth form is direct work on issues of ethnic reconciliation. During my work T helped organize 
both public and private meetings between Serbs and Muslims. These meetings were explicitly 
not a context for discussing national history or the war. They were focussed on administrative 
aspects of the election that left little room for quibbling over ethnic issues. When the meetings 
were seen to be progressing in a civil and productive manner, the international mediators stepped 
back and allowed discussion to follow its own dynamic. T participated in several meetings of 
this kind and watched local political leaders return to levels of acceptance that they themselves 
had not imagined possible before the meeting. These meetings forced participants to accept the 
humanity of the 'other' and to confront the lie that fed this war often in ways that had not 
happened since the war began. With time Bosnian mediation teams could be trained for this 
purpose. Successful meetings could be highly publicized and aired on TV or the radio. 
Another form this could take is the promotion of cross IEBL business. I knew of people 
interested in reconnecting coal and iron mines in the Republic of Serpska with iron factories in 
the Federation. International financial and organizational assistance could have moved these 
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forward. The international community could promote reconciliation by providing great financial 
assistance to communities promoting return, creating international public transportation to cross 
the I.E.B.L., and promoting examples of ethnic reconciliation through the media. Ultimately 
Bosnians will determine the fate of Bosnia. People must chose to vote for their pre-war 
municipalities. Individuals must risk return to their pre-war homes. Communities must accept 
the return of ethnic minorities. The international community could have a substantial, positive 
influence on this process if committed, innovative, flexible and well-organized. 
C) Nine Suggestions 
In conclusion I will briefly develop nine specific suggestions based on the ideas mentioned 
above. These are tangible ways that the international community could intervene more 
effectively in Bosnia. 
1. The Dayton agreement has created several international agencies that assist and monitor 
potentially troublesome Bosnia institutions. These include the War Crimes Tribunal, trying 
suspected war criminals, SFOR, the NATO Stabilization Forces, IPTF, the UN lead 
International Police Task Force, supervising and training local police, OSCE, supervising 
elections, monitoring human rights and facilitating arms control and the OHR, or the Office of 
the High Representative, facilitating civilian aspects of the peace agreement. The Dayton 
Agreement also provides for a comprehensive program of reconstruction assistance. 
The involvement of these organizations are central to the Dayton agreement. They represent an 
unprecedented involvement in the domestic affairs of a nation and should provide tremendous 
lessons for future international intervention in post conflict situations. 
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A tremendous oversight was not establishing an apparatus for monitoring the local media. An 
agency needs to be formally tasked with overseeing, monitoring, and promoting high standards 
of media conduct. While the Provisional Election Commission has a appointed a Media Expert 
Commission 10 it has been mostly ineffective and its mandate is weak. Manipulation of the media 
was a major factor in beginning this war. When I left in 1997 it was very obvious that most of 
the media was under the direct control of various political forces and sought to rally political 
support through the continuation of fear and nationalist propaganda. 
An international news monitoring body could assist and monitor media in a variety of ways. It 
should be given the power to ban media that continues to actively incite fear and hatred, 
aggressively serve the purposes of a particular political regime, or demonstrates an unwillingness 
to broadcast impartial information. Short of banning media, the agency could limit 
inflammatory news stories, it could verify reporting and it could financially support the 
development of new and independent media. The agency would create and promote news events 
that were built upon peace efforts and examples of reconciliation. I was certain these kinds of 
stories were often available but were rarely reported. As long as most of the media continues to 
foster ethnic distrust and fear the entire peace process is in jeopardy. 
2. International financial assistance needs to be more directly linked to communities, areas and 
local organizations that are successfully implementing the Dayton agreement. Communities that 
are assisting the return of ethnic minorities should be given a great priority when international 
assistance and projects are being decided upon. UNHCR was working on this when I left and 
hopefully was able to coordinate other agencies to complement their effort. 
10Unfinished Peace, p.92-93 
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3. Business ventures that involve partners on both sides of the IEBL should be promoted. The 
split of the country into two parts is very recent and in no way reflects any historic or geographic 
division of the country. I personally knew people who were interested in reconnecting coal 
mines on the Serb side of the country to iron factories in Muslim areas. Cross LE.B.L. business 
ventures have a great potential to create locally initiated mutual inter-dependence. Some 
businesses that have been separated by the war require resources that are locally available only 
on the other side of the I.E.B.L .. In other cases large communist-era factories need to tap the 
market for local products that exists on both sides of the I.B.E.L. r knew businessmen and 
technical experts that were willing and anxious to do cross entity business but were obstructed 
by local governments. Communication and travel across the T.E.B.L. was still difficult. 
International organizations could play a substantial role in communication, transportation and 
facilitation of joint business ventures. Financial resources could be made available to cross 
LB.E.L. business projects. 
4. A mosque should be built in the city of Banjo Luka. This idea came from several Muslim 
leaders from this city that are currently living in Sanski Most. Banja Luka is the largest city in 
the Republic of Serpska. Tt had a large Muslim population before the war and is more 
cosmopolitan and progressive than much of the country. With the shift of the Republic of 
Serpska government from the more radical base in Pale to Banja Luka, the city has taken on an 
increased significance. Rebuilding a mosque in this city would be of significant symbolic value. 
It would demonstrate the willingness of Muslims to return to the city. It would serve as a litmus 
to determine the reaction of Serb nationalists without necessarily endangering people. It might 
require Bosnian Serb police protection and would thus test their ability and intention. This could 
possibly be done in conjunction with the construction of an Orthodox church in Sarajevo and a 
Roman Catholic church in a city of Bosnian Croat choice. 
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5. The greatest obstacle to the country's future is the return of displaced people. This will 
determine whether the country ultimately remains divided by ethnicity or begins the process of 
return. The resolution of this issue may determine whether the country returns to war or to 
peaceful co-existence. There are large organized groups on both sides of the IEBL who want to 
return to their pre-war homes. The most obvious way for people to return is for groups on both 
sides of the lEBL to return at the same time. However the war has left many houses destroyed, 
and the Bosnian Diaspora has forced people from different parts of the country to live in houses 
left vacant during the war. The return of one family would often involve the shift of several 
families. When some one attempts to return but their pre-war home is occupied, where do the 
inhabitants move? Where do those who are living in the houses of displaced people move if they 
themselves are not interested in return to their pre-war homes? There are people now all over the 
world and particularly in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia who could be effected by efforts of the war 
displaced to return home. For those not interested in return how is just compensation for 
property destroyed by the war to be worked out? The first several returns are being carefully 
watched by those interested in return. The return of some could have a domino effect with many 
people from all parts of the country involved. I believe the Dayton agreement needs to be 
rethought in light of these issues and formal internationally monitored meetings be held in which 
the more detailed policies for return and property exchange is formalized. 
6. Education will slowly become a forum for working out the long term issues of the war. Over 
time competing versions of history will struggle for acceptance. At this time though versions of 
the war are still so disparate that it is too soon for the war to be addressed formally in schools. 
As Rob Fuderich, UNESCO Education Officer for Bosnia and Central Europe, said, at this point 
education is still best seen as serving the transition into peace by establishing a routine and 
feeling of normalcy about life. Schools should endeavor to address the specific, material 
needs of the country in reconstruction from war. Those with vision could attempt to develop 
programs that address issues relevant to the war without directly confronting the history of the 
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war itself. With the passing of time a common understanding of the war will be reached and 
discussed in schools. 
7. In theory and as a provision of Dayton, people can travel anywhere in the two entities of the 
country. In reality many areas are thought of as inaccessible for fear of what might happen to 
minorities in these areas. UNHCR has set up two bus lines for people wishing to travel across 
the IEBL to particular cities. They have been very useful for people who wish to cross for a day 
and feel unsafe using their own car. This should be built upon. 
8. The passing of time should not be seen as failure, especially this time still close to the war. 
Time eases pain. The pain of the war is tremendous. 
9. During my work in 1997 I arranged some of the first local meetings between Serbs and 
Muslims since the beginning of the war. Since Muslims and Serbs were running for office in the 
same towns, we held these meetings under the pretext of discussing technical election issues. In 
reality though we thought of these pre-election meetings as preparation for implementing the 
election results which would involve elected Serbs and Muslims working together. When local 
Serb and Muslim politicians gathered in a room at first the atmosphere was tense and the 
meeting usually began with an accusatory demeanor. Often these men were pre-war colleagues 
and sometimes friends, now they showed great discomfit simply being in the presence of the 
'other'. They would refuse to eat or drink at the same table with one another. But once the 
meeting was underway and an issue was being discussed~ this bravado would slip away. It was 
as ifthe humanity of the 'other' would come back to them. From afar, through news stories and 
war stories, they could hate, but when confronted with one another in the same room discussing 
an issue that was of mutual importance, the discussion soon slipped into a discussion that might 
be held with a fellow Serb or Muslim. 
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A far greater effort should be made to bring Serbs, Muslims and Croats together to discuss 
almost anything. The issues of the war should be avoided until both sides become comfortable 
with these kinds of meetings. In the beginning the pretext of the meetings should be as neutral 
as possible and facilitated by internationals. Local Bosnians could be trained by accomplished 
facilitators in the early stages of this process. The decisions of the these meetings that are 
reconciliatory in nature should be implemented as quickly as possible. This should be begun at 
the level of local government officials and brought further into local communities with time, 
eventually involving social service providers, teachers, professional technicians and farmers. 
The division of the country is recent enough that in most cases these groups have concerns in 
common. Though real issues that are of common concern to both sides would have to be 
identified and ostensibly worked upon, Bosnians would understand implicitly that the issue 
being worked out would be the nature of their relations together. Your average citizen, more 
pre-occupied with daily life than national identity, would usually welcome this opportunity. As 
Hukanovic says this war required a lie to begin. These meetings could allow members to 
confront the lie and walk away with the truth of one another's humanity. 
VI. Conclusion 
Over the past few years Western politicians have frequently characterized the war in Bosnia and 
more recently in Kosovo as the inevitable continuation of ancient hatreds amongst war-like 
people. This interpretation down plays the role of nationalist leaders in creating these wars. lt 
places the onus of responsibly evenly on all sides of the confrontation and suggests these wars 
are popularly supported. This perspective serves the purpose of relieving national governments 
from the need to intervene, claiming the war was the unavoidable outcome of people with a 
natural tendency to fight rather than an ethnic genocide organized by a handful of leaders. lt 
inadvertently supports the claims of the nationalist leaders themselves who justify this war based 
on historical necessity. However if the war in Bosnia was created by the manipulation and lies 
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of current nationalist leaders during a period of relative multi-ethnic peace, the perspective I 
have developed in several places in this paper, then assisting today's peace process looks quite 
different. The Dayton agreement struggles much more substantially with the problems created 
by the war in 1992 rather than with seething hatreds that are centuries old. The real forces 
behind the war are living leaders. The people of Bosnia are not significantly more inclined to 
war than other cultures. The hope for peace is more realistic than is generally believed. While l 
believe neither of these two perspectives can be seen in isolation as complete explanations, the 
latter comes much closer to describing the situation in Bosnia than the former. 
During my time in Bosnia I saw many indications of hope about the peace process. Yet I found 
many people involved in implementing the Dayton agreement that remained excessively 
pessimistic and fatalistic about continued peace and this hindered implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement. Based on my work experiences and recent readings I have attempted to develop a 
more balanced perspective. I have sought to include fair description of the obstacles to peace 
while pointing to the reasons for hope. Very simply stated I am making a case for a cautious 
optimism. From this perspective I have developed a few specific ideas about how the work of 
the international community could be more effective. Largely as a result of the forceful 
intervention of the international community the situation in Bosnia has improved dramatically 
since Dayton was first sib:rned into effect in 1995. My hope is that an informed and committed 
international effort will continue to successfully serve the process of ethnic reconciliation and 
war reconstruction in Bosnia. 
++++ 
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